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There seems to be no good reason for increasing the contribution of all
employers to offset payments which result from a plan intentionally created
by one of them. A more equitable solution would be to assess the employer
or the union, whichever was the proponent of the plan, for the deficit. How-
ever, legislation to this effect would be unworkable since, due to the com-
plexities of the collective bargaining process, the proponent can seldom be
ascertained.
Perhaps the cost could be borne by the employer on the theory that such
a plan is a type of fringe benefit and that the employer is in a better financial
position to bear the expense. By so excluding the union from contributing,
this method protects the seniors from the inequitable burden of sharing in
the cost of work-share. But, conversely, in many instances, this plan may
result in the inequity of imposing the total cost upon an employer who did
not favor the plan.
Alternatively, the cost could be divided between both the union and the
employer. Under such a plan, the proponent of necessity would be bearing at
least part of the expense, and the inequity of the opponent subsidizing a plan
he did not want would be mitigated by the benefits he receives under work-
share.
It seems that the court actually disqualified Lybarger because it was
convinced that his need did not outweigh the policy problems inherent in
work-share. If this is the case their result cannot be criticized. But a more
direct and defensible approach would have been to admit that Lybarger was
an involuntary quit and then to set forth the policy problems as their basis
for disqualification.
DAVID T. GARVEY
Trade Regulation—Section 7 of the Clayton Act—Conglomerate Ac-
quisitions—"Deep-Pocket" Theory.—Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania
Elec. Prods., Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC.2—In the Smith-Victor case,
Sylvania greatly enhanced its over-all size and wealth through a series of
acquisitions commencing in 1936. In 1960, Sylvania entered the amateur
photo-lighting equipment market, a Iine of commerce in which all the com-
petitors were small. Smith-Victor, one of the competitors, brought this action
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,3
 alleging that the emergence of a deep-
pocket competitor, Sylvania, in its line of commerce would substantially lessen
1 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. III. 1965).
2
 347 F,2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
3
 64- Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The
pertinent part of § 7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part•of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
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competition and that it had already damaged Smith-Victor. Dismissing the
complaint, the district court HELD: The complaint fails to state a claim
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act on the deep-pocket theory. In a private
action based on the deep-pocket theory8 the plaintiff must allege that one of
the corporations was engaged in its line of commerce at the time of the
acquisition.
In the second case, Ekco, a large diversified manufacturer, acquired
McClintock, a small firm with a virtual monopoly in commercial meat-
handling equipment. A year later, in 1955, Blackman and Chesley entered
the field and by 1958 had captured eighteen per cent of the market. At this
time, after unsuccessfully attempting to acquire Chesley, Ekco purchased
Blackman and after this purchase succeeded in regaining fourteen per cent
of the lost market. The hearing examiner dismissede an FTC complaint'
which alleged that the acquisitions of McClintock and Blackman by Ekco
violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. On appeal, the Commission reversed
the dismissal and ordered, in part, that Ekco divest itself of the McClintock
holdings. 8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HELD: Ekco's
acquisition of McClintock violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The court
felt that the post-acquisition purchase of Blackman and attempted purchase
of Chesley indicated that Ekco's acquisition of McClintock tended to entrench
the McClintock monopoly. 9
When Congress amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, 10 it
intended to strengthen its policy of preventing monopoly in its incipiency,
thereby protecting competition." This policy against the concentration of
corporate wealth and power, however, did not include prohibition of all
4 A private action is to be distinguished from an action brought by the Government.
In the former, the plaintiff must allege and prove that there was a breach of statute, that
he falls within the class that the statute was meant to protect, and that he was damaged
as a result of the violation. See Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc,, 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (1965 Trade Cas.) 11 71397, at 80672 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1965). In the latter, the
Government must prove there was a breach of statute, the primary concern being with
the lessening of competition in general—not with the harm to a single competitor.
The court, however, left open the question as to whether a private action might be
brought under § 7.
5 This theory is also known as the "rich-parent" or "wealth" theory.
6 The hearing examiner's opinion was based upon the following factors: Ease of
entry by others into the market, substantial actual and potential competition, the
irrelevancy of post-acquisition evidence to a 7 case, and dissipation of the Blackman
assets rendering divestiture of that acquisition moot. Ekco Prods. Co., Trade Reg. Rep.
Tr. Binder, 1963-1965 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 1[ 16879, at 21900 (1964).
7 Ekco Prods. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1960-1961 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations 11 29106, at 37538 (1960).
8 Ekco Prods. Co., supra note 6, at 21895.
9 The court also felt that Ekco probably would have entered the field on its own,
thereby offering effective competition to McClintock
10 Section 7, as amended, differs from the original Clayton Act of 1914 in three
important respects. First, it extends coverage from horizontal mergers to vertical and
conglomerate as well. Second, it extends its prohibitions of stock acquisitions to assets
acquisitions. Finally, it applies in all cases to a lessening of competition "in any section
of the country" rather than to "any section or community" in certain specific cases. See
FTC, Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 154-56 (1955).
11
 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
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corporate acquisitions—only those which might substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly." In carrying out the congressional
intent and policy as to conglomerate acquisitions," the FTC and the courts
have established various guidelines." One of these is the deep-pocket theory.
The first significant application of the deep-pocket theory to invalidate a
corporate merger was Reynolds Metals Co. v. PTC' 5 in 1962. In that case,
Reynolds, a large manufacturer of aluminum foil, acquired Arrow Brands,
which converted such foil into decorative foil and then sold it to florists.
Reynolds thereby entered a field in which all the competitors were small.
Applying the deep-pocket theory to uphold the Commission's order of divesti-
ture, the court stated that the deep-pocket power of Reynolds to provide
Arrow with advantages over its competitors was sufficient to bring the case
within the proscriptions of section 7. The court specifically rejected post-
acquisition evidence of price-cutting as not essential to its decision."
A second case decided on the deep-pocket rationale was Procter &
Gamble Co." in 1963. Procter, a large diversified corporation, extended itself
into the liquid bleach industry by acquiring Clorox. Clorox controlled
fifty per cent of the market in which all the other competitors were small.
The Commission ordered divestiture on the basis of the ability of Procter's
conglomerate organization to shift its financial resources and competitive
strength18 in order to concentrate its efforts in the liquid bleach industry and
thereby lessen competition. The major fear of the Commission was that the
distinctive nature of the industry could be drastically transformed by the
substitution of a billion-dollar deep-pocket corporation for Clorox. The court
12 Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
13 These are to be distinguished from horizontal, vertical and product-extension
acquisitions. A horizontal acquisition has the effect of automatically eliminating a com-
petitor. A vertical acquisition has the effect of foreclosing to competitors a market
outlet or a source of supply. In a conglomerate acquisition there is "no discernible
relationship in the business between the acquiring and acquired firms." 1 Trade Reg.
Rep. If 4350 (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). In a product-
extension acquisition, the products of the two parties to the acquisition bear some
relationship in the type of customers to whom they are sold and in the methods of dis-
tribution. Generally, product-extension acquisitions are classified as conglomerate since
they are neither horizontal nor verticaL
14 See, e.g., the "dominant" theory, note 22 infra, and the "reciprocal" theory, note
28 infra.	 -
13 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
le The court stated: "The Commission is not required to establish that the Reynolds'
acquisition of Arrow did in fact have anti-competitive consequences. It is sufficient if
the Commission shows the acquisition had the capacity or potentiality to lessen com-
petition." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 230.
17
 Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1963-1965 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
16673 (1963).
18
 The court stated:
At the least, Procter's manifest strength in markets other than liquid bleach
rebuts any inference that Procter cannot wield the advantages that flow both
from its own financial size and strength and from the dominant position in the
liquid bleach industry enjoyed by Clorox.
Id. at 21584.
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added that its decision was in no way dependent upon "the actual course of
Procter's post-merger conduct.” 19
Reynolds and Procter, therefore, stand for this proposition: generally,
when a big corporation acquires a small corporation, it is reasonably probable
that it will provide for the small corporation a deep pocket of resources and
that the small corporation will draw and reap significant benefits from the
deep pocket to the detriment of its competition. No other fact is required to
invalidate the acquisition. In contrast, Smith-Victor and Ekco involve dif-
ferent forms2° of the deep-pocket theory and require post-acquisition evidence
to void a merger.
In Smith-Victor, the plaintiff simply alleged that after a series of ac-
quisitions which greatly enhanced its economic power, Sylvania entered
Smith-Victor's line of commerce and thereby lessened competition. Thus the
plaintiff sought to expand the deep-pocket theory of Reynolds and Procter in
two respects. First, the plaintiff did not allege that any of the firms acquired
by Sylvania competed in its Line of commerce at the time of acquisition and
prior to Sylvania's entry; in Reynolds and Procter the acquired firm was
engaged in the relevant line of commerce at the time of acquisition. Broadly
considered, the expansion of the deep-pocket theory in this respect would
prevent any large corporation which gained its wealth through prior ac-
quisitions from entering new lines of commerce through internal expansion.
Since internal, expansion is an approved method of corporate growth, 2 ' the
theory Smith-Victor urged upon the court would extend section 7 beyond the
limits intended by Congress and would prevent competition from growing.
Second, Smith-Victor's allegations were to the effect that the small corpora-
tions created the deep pocket for Sylvania; 22 in Reynolds and Procter the
deep pocket was provided by the large firm for the benefit of the small
acquired firm. It is clear, then, that the deep-pocket theory is simply in-
applicable to the facts of Smith-Victor, and the court was correct in refusing
to extend it.
While the fact situation in Ekco is similar to both Reynolds and Proc-
ter,23 the court did not expressly use the deep-pocket theory. Rather, the
court's basis for concluding that the McClintock acquisition was unlawful
was that it served to entrench and preserve McClintock's monopoly—the
Blackman purchase illustrating how the acquisition preserved the monopoly. 24
19 Id. at 21579.
20 In Smith-Victor the plaintiff posited the new form of deep-pocket theory, but
it was rejected by the court.
21 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, at 370 (1963).
22 Smith-Victor's argument resembles the "dominant" theory of Scott Paper Co.
v. FTC, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962), remanded, Scott Paper Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Tr.
Binder, 1963-1965 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 1 16706 (1964). According to
the dominant theory, the acquisitions increase the productive capacity of the acquiring
company, thereby strengthening its dominant position in many of the markets in which
it is active. Id. at 21633. Smith-Victor could not have prevailed • on the dominant theory
since the acquisitions did not strengthen Sylvania's position in any market in which
Smith-Victor competed.
23 I.e., a large corporation acquired a small corporation.
24 Supra note 2, at 752.
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Alone, McClintock could not have acquired Blackman; 28 but Ekco, with its
deep pocket, was able to maintain McClintock's monopoly position by buy-
ing out its competitor. In effect, then, the court has set forth a new form of
deep-pocket theory. Whereas in Reynolds and Procter the power of the large
firm was exercised through the small firm, Ekco goes over McClintock's head
and purchases Blackman outright. This difference, however, is one of form
rather than substance since it is only relevant that the deep pocket may be
used to enhance the competitive position of the acquired firm and not how
the deep pocket may be used.
Unlike Reynolds and Procter, Smith-Victor and Ekco require post-ac-
quisition evidence to invalidate the acquisition. Smith-Victor expressly rejects
the Reynolds holding that the deep-pocket theory without more is sufficient
to invalidate the acquisition of a small firm by a large firm: "The Court's
result [in Reynolds] is probably correct, in light of the evidence of the effect
on competition caused by price-cutting . . . . "26 A broad reading of Ekco
discloses that it is in basic agreement with Smith-Victor:
The fact that a large corporation purchases a corporation with a vir-
tual monopoly in its field does not, by that fact alone, render the
merger violative of Section 7. However, such fact may subject the
merger to careful scrutiny to determine if additional facts exist from
which a violation may be found.27
The court then relied on the post-acquisition purchase of Blackman to strike
down the McClintock merger. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 28 the Smith-Victor and Ekco requirement
of post-acquisition evidence is unwarranted. In Consolidated Foods, the Court
suggested that although post-acquisition evidence may be considered, it
is not necessary to rely on it. The force of section 7 is in probabilities, and
to rely on what later transpires is to reduce its strength. 2° Essentially, then,
all that section 7 requires is a predictive judgment that the acquisition will
probably have anticompetitive effects. As Reynolds and Procter point out,
in a deep-pocket situation this probability exists at the time of acquisition,
and post-acquisition evidence is unnecessary.
It should be noted that Ekco, read narrowly, may be consistent with the
Reynolds and Procter position on post-acquisition evidence. The fact situa-
25
 Ibid.
26 Supra note 1, at 319.
27 Supra note 2, at 751. The court's meaning of "additional facts" is unclear. Since
the opinion generally refers to post-acquisition evidence, it is reasonable to suppose that
this is all the term means.
28 380 U.S. 592 (1965). There, Consolidated, which owned food-processing plants
and a network of wholesale and retail food stores, acquired Gentry, a manufacturer of
dehydrated onion and garlic. The FTC invalidated the acquisition on the "reciprocal"
theory. Agreeing with the Commission, the Court expressed concern over the subtle and
unwritten but well-understood rules of the market place which would cause customers of
Consolidated to feel constrained to purchase products of Gentry to the detriment of
Gentry's competitors. These psychological factors are generally seen more dearly in
the deep-pocket situation where the intrusion of a large corporation into a new line of
commerce causes potential competitors to refrain from entering that line of commerce.
2'a Id. at 598
396
CASE NOTES
tion in Ekco differed from that in Reynolds and Procter in that, McClintock
being a monopoly, Ekco entered a line of commerce in which there was no
competition to lessen. In view of this fact, the court felt it could not predict
anticompetitive effects on the basis of the acquisition alone and therefore
required post-acquisition evidence. The court pointed out that its holding ap-
plied only to the narrow factual situation of the Ekco case. In all probability,
however, Ekco should be read as consistent with Smith-Victor in requiring
post-acquisition evidence or some additional fact to invalidate a corporate
acquisition on the basis of the deep-pocket theory. The courts' requirement
seems to reflect a belief that the deep-pocket theory is a per se theory of
illegality30 and therefore unacceptable. In fact, however, the deep-pocket
theory simply raises a strong presumption of illegality—a presumption which
the defendant can rebut by coming forth with conclusive proof that the deep
pocket will not be used or that the theory does not apply to his case.
MICHAEL J. BALANOFF
Trade Regulation—Section 35 of Lanham Act—Accounting for Profits.
—Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg. Co. 1—Plaintiff Monsanto
manufactures and markets an acrylic fiber under its registered trademark
"Acrilan."2 Monsanto sold twenty thousand pounds of this fiber to defendant
Perfect Fit which used it in the manufacture of mattress pads. Defendant
sold them with labels bearing plaintiff's trademark and representing to cus-
tomers that the mattress pads were one hundred per cent Acrilan. Monsanto
purchased and analyzed several of these and determined that none contained
more than twenty-five per cent Acrilan and some contained no Acrilan at all.
Perfect Fit admitted the mislabeling and met with Monsanto in July and
August of 1958, but no settlement was reached. In November of 1958, Mon-
santo initiated a federal suit in the Southern District of New York for trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition.
The district court, sitting without a jury, found that Perfect Fit had in-
fringed Monsanto's trademark and that Perfect Fit had "deliberately at-
tempted to capitalize on the reputation which plaintiff had established for its
acrylic fiber."3 The court issued a permanent injunction and awarded legal
30 Ekco argued that the Commission had applied an absolute prohibition against
all acquisitions of small firms by large firms without regard to other factors. Supra note
2, at 751. The deep-pocket theory, however, is not a per se theory of illegality, although
it approaches one. It is not every acquisition of a small firm by a large firm that is
likely to have the substantial lessening of competition effects proscribed by § 7. In
some cases the acquisition may tend to increase competition. Some acquisitions may be
de minimis and have such a slight impact on competition, if any, that the law will
take no notice of them. The fact situation of each case will still be examined; the deep-
pocket theory, however, will make it more difficult to prove that the merger should not
be invalidated.
1
 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3192 (U.S.
Nov. 24, 1965) (No. 763).
2
 646 O.G. Pat. Off. 387 (1951); 674 0G. Pat. Off. 575 (1953).
a Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg. Co., 232 F. Supp. 493, 494-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
397
